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Abstract: The current health care financing system in Sierra Leone is unsustainable and poses challenges ranging from 
increased in out of pocket health care expenditure to accessibility problems, particularly in rural areas where living standards 
are low and health care facilities are scarce. This paper investigates whether privately financed health Insurance can improve 
the accessibility to formal health care in Sierra Leone and mitigate the effects of OOPs on poor households. To do so, we 
estimate the Willingness To Pay (WTP) for health insurance among informal sector workers in Sierra Leone using a Discrete 
Choice Experiment approach. Eight informal sector activities were selected namely – petty trading, subsistence farming, 
commercial bike riding, cattle rearing, fishing, tailoring, mining and quarrying. A random effect logit model is used to estimate 
households’ WTP for an improvement in coverage, choice of health care provider and a reduction in waiting time. Our study 
reveals that households were WTP more to have better attributes (better coverage, less waiting time) and to go to a faith - based 
provider. Our findings also suggest that location – rural versus urban – matters in determining the WTP since urban households 
were WTP more for health insurance than their rural counterparts, (SLL 54,348 or $7.34) and (SLL 37,250.5 or $5.03), 
respectively. 
Keywords: Health Insurance, Willingness to Pay, Discrete Choice Experiment, Informal Sector, Sierra Leone,  
Sierra Leonean Leones 
 
1. Introduction 
Over 2 billion people living in developing countries are 
faced with health systems characterized by inefficiencies, 
poor quality services, inequitable access; inadequate funding; 
and high out of pocket (OOP) health care expenditures [10]. 
The high OOP payments for health care deter the poor, 
especially those in the informal sector, from accessing basic 
health care services. 
Lack of access to health care and high health care 
expenditures are discussed in the literature as one of the 
primary causes of poverty and deprivation of rural 
households in poor countries. The poor often live without 
formal safety nets and suffer from high job insecurity, hence 
increasing their vulnerability to shocks that eventually leave 
them in severe poverty [19]. Improved health care financing 
mechanisms such as access to a low-cost health insurance 
scheme for low income households could help mitigate this 
situation. Health insurance schemes are central to 
improvements in the health status of a country’s population, 
as they subsidize access to health services during periods of 
ill health [10]. Scholars argue that health insurance plays an 
important role in accessing medical care and reducing the 
high cost of OOP health care expenditures, improving health 
and the economic well being of people. 
The question therefore is how much poor people are 
willing to pay for health insurance to avoid the uncertainty of 
the negative financial impacts associated to shocks of ill 
health. As health insurance is a non-marketed good, 
estimating the willingness to pay for health insurance will be 
essential. Willingness To Pay (WTP) is the most popular 
evaluation technique used to elicit preferences in health 
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economics. WTP is a stated preference approach that 
estimates the maximum amount of money a 
person/household is willing to pay or give up to obtain a 
particular benefit or service being sold such as health 
insurance, health services or environmental products [21, 31]. 
WTP aims to determine how much individuals are prepared 
to pay to reduce their risk of mortality and morbidity from 
the present [28] or the demand society places on that product 
[16]. WTP can be estimated either through contingent 
valuation methods or through Discrete Choice Experiments 
(DCE), which are less prone to reporting biases in surveys 
[14]. 
The objective of this paper is to estimate WTP for health 
insurance among informal sector workers in Sierra Leone 
using a DCE approach. The key questions that this research 
tries to answer are, first, how much informal sector 
households are willing to pay for health insurance; second, 
whether location (rural or urban) matters in deciding WTP 
for health insurance and finally, which attributes the informal 
sector workers are most willing to trade. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, is the description 
of the data set and the provision of some background 
information about DCE methods. Next, is to provide the 
econometric specification before presenting the results of the 
WTP estimates, which are compared between locations and 
different informal sector activities. Discussion of results and 
conclusion are presented in the last section. 
2. Background 
2.1. Context 
The data for this study were obtained in Sierra Leone – a 
country of about 7 million people living along the west coast 
of Africa - by means of a DCE conducted in the northern and 
western regions of Sierra Leone. The choice of these specific 
regions was driven by one of the researcher’s prior 
knowledge and familiarity, which enhances the quality of the 
data collected at least to a certain degree, as well as the 
accuracy of the econometric results [6]. 
This paper focuses on informal sector households, which 
have no contractual arrangement for health care, as opposed 
to formal sector employees. The informal sector workers 
coping with vulnerabilities like flooding, fire accident, 
sickness, famine etc. and the lack of a special scheme and 
considerations for this population makes their living 
conditions difficult [12]. Informal sector households facing 
poor health do not have formal safety nets to provide them 
with the necessary financial resources for basic consumption 
needs such as transportation, education and food and they do 
not access appropriate health care at the point of need 
because of lack of money [1]. 
The International Labour Office (ILO) in 1993 (during the 
fifteenth international conference of labour statisticians) 
defined informal sector as composed of entities engaged in 
the production of goods or services with the main objective 
of generating employment and income [32]. These entities 
operate at two levels of organizations - with little or no 
division between labour and capital, and on a small scale 
[32]. The labour regulations in these settings are based on 
casual employment, relatives, kinship, no contractual 
arrangements with formal guarantees etc. 
The informal sector in Sierra Leone represents 45% of 
GDP, involving about two thirds of the working population 
and is dominated by different kinds of small – scale 
enterprises and business activities [40]. These activities 
include cookery, tailoring, carpentry, metal working, shoe 
making, baking, photography, watch and radio repairs, hair 
dressing, subsistence farming, commercial bike riding 
(“okada”), petty trading, cattle rearing, fishing, etc. [20]. Due 
to its wider scope and variety of activities, the informal 
sector absorbs a seemingly unlimited number of people in 
different occupations. Petty trading is the hallmark of the 
informal sector in Sierra Leone. The informal sector in Sierra 
Leone is characterized by poverty, low levels of education, 
economic and social deprivation and weak employment 
conditions. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, a 
household whose main source of livelihood comes from petty 
trading, subsistence farming, commercial bike riding 
(“Okada”), cattle rearing, fishing, tailoring, alluvial mining, 
and quarrying is classified as an informal sector household. 
2.2. Data Collection 
Statistics Sierra Leone (SSL) designed the sample for this 
study based on recent pre-census data that has information on 
settlement names, population and household sizes. A two-
stage stratified random sampling method was used to identify 
the households. The first stage involved dividing the 
population into regions/districts, while in the second stage 
the population was divided into rural and urban areas in each 
district. The purpose was to ensure a representative sample of 
informal sector households in both villages (rural areas) and 
major towns (urban areas). Households were randomly 
chosen from both strata. The choice of the household as the 
economic unit stems from the notion that in poor informal 
households, the economic decision to purchase health care 
among these rural and mostly farming households is more 
likely to be a household rather than an individual decision. 
The questionnaire developed is divided into three sections: 
(1) a question to help identify the informal sector the 
household is engaged in; (2) introduction to the DCE and the 
series of blocked choice questions to make a choice from; 
and (3) background questions on household socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics. A pilot study was done to 
test the attributes, their levels, the questionnaire and 
necessary corrections made before we undertake the final 
survey. The main survey was conducted within the period 
May to July 2013. Data entry staffs did the cleaning and 
entering of the data. 
An interviewer administered the questionnaire and all 
households sampled (1,670) agreed to participate in the 
study. The information was collected at the household level 
and thereby ensured that either the head of the household or 
his/her spouse answered the questions. In our final sample, 
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we use the answers from a total of 1,458 households. We 
discarded 212 households responses (12.7%): 66 of such 
households did not pass the dominance test, meaning they did 
not understand the DCE questions, and 146 households have 
incomplete data; hence their responses are excluded from the 
data. This was tested and based on their observable 
characteristics; the excluded households were not 
significantly different from the rest of the sample, which 
gives confidence that the results are unlikely to be biased by 
selection issues. Thus, the dataset contains the answers of 
1,458 households, which were given 9 choice sets with 2 
alternatives each, i.e. having a total of 26,244 observations. 
Definitions and descriptive statistics of the health care 
package and the attributes chosen, the socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics of the households in the sample 
used are reported in Table 1 below. For each variable, the 
means in rural and urban areas, the mean difference across 
locations, standard errors and statistical significance of the 
difference were shown. Overall, the results show that the 
distribution of the health insurance scheme attributes and 
household characteristics varies significantly between 
households that live in rural versus urban areas in terms of 
income, occupation and levels of education. 
Table 1. Variable definitions. 
Variable Definition 
Rural Urban Mean Difference Standard Error of 
Difference of Means1 (N = 17694) (N = 8550) (Rural – Urban) 
Cost 
Attribute that defines the amount to be paid for the health 
insurance scheme: 4,000, 6,000 & 10,000 SLL. 
 6,666.82   6,666.36  0.46257 32.85452 
Coverage2 
Attribute that defines the benefit of the scheme: Simple, 
Moderate & Comprehensive= 1 if covered and 0 otherwise. 
0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.01075 
Waiting Time 
Attribute that shows the waiting time to see a doctor/nurse: 
45, 60 and 90 minutes. 
64.95 65.1 -0.15005 0.24641 
Public Provider3 
Attribute = 1 when visited (what is a public provider) and 0 
otherwise.  
33.5% 33.0% 0.5% 0.00621 
Faith-Based 
Provider 
Attribute; = 1 when visited and 0 otherwise.  33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 0.00621 
Petty Trading Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 16.4% 26.7% -10.4% 0.0052*** 
Subsistence 
Farming 
Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 27.2% 26.5% 0.6% 0.287 
‘Okada’ Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 22.8% 21.7% 1.1% 0.00549** 
Cattle Rearing Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 5.1% 4.6% 0.5% 0.00285 
Fishing Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 9.0% 5.5% 3.5% 0.00353*** 
Tailoring Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 11.1% 9.3% 1.8% 0.00404*** 
Mining Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 4.8% 1.5% 3.3% 0.00248*** 
Quarrying Reported type of informal sector = 1; 0 otherwise. 3.8% 4.2% -0.4% 0.00255* 
No Education 
Reported whether household did not go to school = 1; 0 
otherwise. 
30.5% 36.6% -6.1% 0.00616*** 
Primary Education 
Reported whether household got primary education = 1; 0 
otherwise 
6.5% 6.9% -0.4% 0.00328 
Adult Education 
Reported whether household got adult education = 1; 0 
otherwise 
19.5% 9.9% 9.6% 0.00484*** 
Basic Education 
Reported whether household got basic education = 1; 0 
otherwise 
37.0% 38.5% -1.5% 0.00638** 
Secondary 
Education 
Reported whether household got secondary education = 1; 
0 otherwise 
6.4% 8.0% -1.6% 0.00334*** 
Household Size 
Number of members in the household at the time of the 
interview. 
5.01 5.12 -0.11152 0.03063*** 
Age of Household 
Head 
Reported age of head of household. 42.83 44.99 -2.16005 0.17406*** 
Remittance Whether household receives remittance (amount)  37,316.46   76,415.63   (39,099.17) 1613.89*** 
Household 
Expenditure 
Amount household spends on basic necessities like feeding, 
health care, education, transportation etc. 
 370,032.40  
 
378,174.20  
 (8,141.81) 1539.86*** 
Diseases 
Whether any household member has suffered from malaria 
or typhoid fever in the three months prior to interview; yes 
= 1; 0 otherwise 
0.72837 0.7474 -0.01903 0.00581*** 
Distance to HC 
Reported distance in miles from village to nearest health 
centre 
2.13 2.19 -0.03742 0.03415 
Notes: 
1. Significant differences are indicated by *** if p<0.01, ** if p<0.05 or * if p<0.1. 
2. Simple coverage covers Primary Health Care Diseases and Minor Operations; Moderate coverage refers to coverage of Secondary Health Care Diseases 
including major operations; and Comprehensive coverage covers Tertiary Health Care Diseases. However, this work uses Moderate Coverage as the 
definition of Coverage throughout this paper. 
3. Provider here refers to owners of health facilities including hospitals, clinics, diagnostic centres etc. 
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2.3. Discrete Choice Experiment Design 
There has been a growing interest and increasing number of 
studies using DCE methodology in Environmental and Health 
Economics studies since it’s introduction in the 1980s [5, 11, 16, 
29, 30, 38]. In this study, a DCE methodology was used to 
investigate households’ WTP for health insurance [39].1 Within 
the stated preference methods used in the literature, the 
increasing success of choice modeling rests on its ability to 
simultaneously allow for the estimation of the relative 
importance or trade-offs between the health insurance attributes, 
and the total benefit households derive from such service. DCEs 
are based on the idea that households derive utility not from a 
good per se but from the underlying attributes of the good [22]. 
In this context, DCEs present households with alternative 
descriptions of a health insurance scheme differentiated by 
combinations of attribute levels. Households are asked to choose 
their preferred alternative. One of the main assumptions inherent 
in a DCE is, for each choice made, the chosen alternative is 
assumed to yield a higher level of satisfaction than the one 
rejected. This allows the probability of the chosen alternative to 
be modeled in terms of attribute levels. 
This study follows the five stages highlighted in 
undertaking a DCE [33]. This raises few issues mainly to 
determine the overall policy objective and the type of choice 
experiment to be designed [18, 23, 34], which we consider in 
the next subsections. 
2.3.1. Choosing Attributes and Levels 
During the survey, the households were asked to make a 
choice between two health insurance schemes, A and B. First, 
the study started by identifying the attributes relevant to describe 
the two health insurance schemes and to be used in the DCE 
design. For this purpose, a search through the literature was 
done and thereby identified 10 attributes.2 A list with the 10 
attributes was sent to 50 households and each household was 
asked to rank the 10 attributes in order of importance. The main 
question in this pre-test survey read: “Assuming a national 
health insurance scheme is to be introduced in the country, what 
are the key factors you will take into consideration before 
joining the said scheme, and from the list of attributes shown, 
please tick according to your order of preference”. 
The four most important attributes the households chose 
were coverage, waiting time, choice of health care provider 
and cost. Coverage as an attribute refers to the type of benefit 
the scheme will provide to members. Waiting time refers to 
the time it will take for a member to see a medical worker 
upon their visit to a hospital or a health centre. The choice of 
health care provider refers to the type of health care insured 
people will be able to access namely: Public, faith-based and 
private providers. Cost refers to the amount of money or 
premium to pay in order to participate in the health insurance 
                                                               
1 To the best of our knowledge, this is the only published paper that used DCE to 
estimate WTP for health insurance 
2  The attributes include cost, coverage, choice of provider, waiting time, 
information, choice of drugs, new method of treatment, frequency in use of 
benefits, location of providers, and terminal diseases to be fully covered. 
scheme chosen. Cost is one essential attribute in all WTP for 
health insurance studies as it allows to monetarise the value 
respondent’s place on the rest of the attributes (see more 
details with the econometric model). These four chosen 
attributes are widely used in the literature in estimating WTP 
and are plausible, quantifiable and above all easily 
recognized by the respondents. 
In line with the preceding argument and WTP studies in 
developing countries, three levels were assigned to each of 
the attributes chosen. The final four attributes and their three 
levels each are shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. Attribute and Levels used in the study. 
Attributes Attribute Levels Description 
Coverage 
Simple 
Moderate 
Comprehensive 
Primary Health Care Diseases 
and Minor Operations 
Secondary Health Care Diseases 
and Major Operations 
Tertiary Health Care Diseases 
Waiting Time 
45 Minutes 
60 Minutes 
90 Minutes 
The length of time one has to 
wait before seeing a medical 
personnel  
Choice of 
Provider 
Private 
Public 
Faith-Based 
Health centres and hospitals owned 
and operated by private people 
Health centres and hospitals owned 
and operated by Government 
Health centres and hospitals owned 
and operated by faith-based 
organisations 
Cost/Premium 
4000SLL (0.54USD) 
6000SLL (0.81USD) 
10000SLL (1.35USD)3 
The monthly premium a member 
will pay for the scheme 
The three choices of providers were selected based on what 
exists in Sierra Leone. There are three types of health care 
facilities in Sierra Leone namely; private, public (government 
owned) and faith-based providers. The private facility is 
owned and operated by private individuals or families. The 
public or government facility is owned and managed by 
government. The faith-based facilities are owned and operated 
by religious organizations and/or non-governmental 
organizations. However, the payment of salaries depends on 
the type of arrangement with government. The government 
pays the salaries of some of the faith-based facilities staff, 
whereas for the others, their salaries are funded by the faith-
based organizations themselves. 
2.3.2. Experiment Design 
The first process involved the identification of the 
attributes and assigning levels to them. Then, choice profiles 
are generated from combining attributes and levels. To ensure 
the cognitive burden of respondents is reduced to a workable 
size, a fractional factorial design (FFD)4 is used to reduce the 
number of profiles to a manageable number without losing 
                                                               
3 The exchange rate used right through this work is at November 2016; $1 = 
7400SLL. 
4 A fractional factorial design involves the selection of a portion of all possible 
profiles, in which the properties of the full factorial design are maintained such 
that the effects of interest can be calculated as efficiently as possible. 
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the chance of estimating main effects in the design. A total of 
18 choice profiles were generated using the FFD, 
subsequently structured into two blocks of 9 choice sets each. 
An extra tenth choice question is included in each block to 
test whether households understand the DCE questions. 
Hence, each household was presented with 10 choice 
questions – 9 for the main DCE and 1 to test the level of 
understanding of the questions. Table 3 below gives an 
example of a choice set as shown in the questionnaire. 
Table 3. Example of a choice set used in the questionnaire. 
 
Health Insurance 
Scheme A 
Health Insurance 
Scheme B 
Coverage5 Comprehensive Simple 
Waiting Time (Minutes) 45 90 
Choice of Provider Public Contracted 
Cost (SLL) 4,000 6,000 
Which Scheme would you prefer   
All the attribute levels are presented and described to 
respondents before carrying out the choice experiments. The 
essence of this process is to minimise the size of ‘warm glow’ 
biases, which can affect stated preference methods [3]. In 
addition to the choice questions, the questionnaire captured 
relevant socio-economic characteristics for each household. 
Based on the aforementioned, the efficiency of the 
experimental design compared to the full design is assessed 
at 91.7%, using [37] website.6 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The theoretical basis for the model estimation is based on 
the Random Utility Theory (RUT), which explains that the 
choice of a health insurance scheme is made based on the 
scheme with the highest utility [26]. One assumption made is 
that the utility of a household is a linear and additive function 
of attributes wherein a change in the level of one attribute 
does not affect the marginal utility of another attribute. Thus, 
following [4, 15, 27, 36] we estimate the model thus: 
 =	 + 	
 + 
 + ℎℎ +

ℎℎ +  +  + 	         (1) 
where the subscripts i and j refer to household i and 
household’s choice of health insurance scheme j, 
respectively; 
  refers to coverage of the health insurance 
scheme j chosen by household i; ℎℎ  means the chosen 
scheme j is provided by a public supplier; 
ℎℎ  that the 
provider is faith-based; and  , the waiting time 
associated to the choice j.  	the household fixed effect and 
  the household’s choice idiosyncratic error, which we 
assume are not correlated, i.e. corr ( + ) = ρ [13, 25]. 
The coefficient  , the intercept, captures the overall 
performance of the health insurance j when all other 
attributes are set at the default categories [35].7 The rest of 
                                                               
5 Moderate coverage is used as the definition of coverage right throughout this work 
6 http://crsu.science.uts.edu.ac/choice. 
7 Scott (2001) explained that the constant term is included in a DCE model to test 
the coefficients, 	,	,	 are interpreted as the marginal 
utilities of each of the five attributes of health insurance. 
The sign and the statistical significance of each coefficient is 
used to quantify the relative importance of the attributes. This 
allows calculating the Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS), 
i.e. how respondents are willing to trade an improvement in 
one attribute in order to forgo the other attribute. Because one 
of the health insurance scheme j attributes is cost, we can 
calculate the WTP for attribute k by using the MRS between 
cost and attribute k, i.e. using the ratio of the marginal utility of 
attribute k over that of cost [34]: 
 ! =- 
"# $%%&'(%)	!⁄
"#⁄ +,-%.
 =−	
0.1
23456.
             (2) 
To estimate equation (1), we apply a binary choice model 
[37] using the random effects logit model in STATA/SE 13.1. 
4. Results 
4.1. Empirical Results 
The first part of the analysis looks at the regression results for 
the entire sample and sub-samples - by type of location and 
informal sector activity.8 Second, estimating household’s overall 
WTP using the sub–samples. The third part of the analysis looks 
at welfare changes and the theoretical validity of the model.  
Table 4 below summarizes the results of the logit model used 
to analyze the impact of each attribute on the choice of a health 
insurance scheme. In terms of goodness of fit, for the overall 
sample, the attributes are statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level. The statistical significance of each attribute is 
tested using the Wald test. Results show that all chosen attributes 
are statistically significant (≤ 0.05), recognizing that the type of 
coverage, cost of the health insurance scheme, type of provider 
(public/private, faith-based or not), and waiting time all 
significantly influence a household’s choice of health insurance 
scheme. The negative coefficients associated to cost and waiting 
time are in line with theory; the higher the cost of a health 
insurance scheme, the less likely people are WTP for it. And, the 
higher the waiting time, the less likely people are WTP for the 
scheme. The positive coverage coefficients indicate that 
households are WTP more for an improvement in coverage. 
Moreover private providers are not financially accessible to 
most of the households, which is an important determinant of 
their choice as shown in Table 4, both by the positive coefficient 
associated to Public type of provider and the negative effect of 
costs. Households in the informal sector are also WTP more for 
faith-based providers. These results are in line with expectations 
and therefore provide support for our model. 
 
                                                                                                           
and control for model misspecifications that arise, from either unobserved 
dimensions or unobserved interactions between household’s socio-
economic/demographic characteristics and dimensions.  
8 We estimate WTP for each informal sector in order to know which ones are 
WTP more than the others and to guide policy makers. This information is useful 
for planning cooperative insurance schemes, which are based on occupations and 
are becoming common in SSA. 
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Table 4. Regression results: main sample and by location. 
Choice 
Main Sample Rural Household Urban Household 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Coverage*9 0.54596 0.01624*** 0.52670 0.02218*** 0.57192 0.02393*** 
Waiting Time -0.00793 0.00071*** -0.00664 0.00096*** -0.00952 0.00104*** 
Public Provider 0.05376 0.01590*** 0.03083 0.02179 0.08071 0.02329*** 
Faith-Based Provider 0.5650 0.01641*** 0.44470 0.02225*** 0.70485 0.02446*** 
Cost -0.00009 5.33e06*** -0.00009 7.28e06*** -0.00008 7.84e-06*** 
Constant 0.75884 0.06273*** 0.68839 0.08521*** 0.850002 0.093005*** 
No of Obs. 26244 13770 12474 
Wald chi2 (5) 2553.25 1121.51 1472.88 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log Likelihood -16713.37 -8912.80 -7762.7474 
***Indicates significant at p<0.01; *Coverage here refers to Moderate Coverage. 
According to Table 4, results for both types of locations are very similar except that the effect of public provider on the 
provider choice is not significant for rural households. Moreover, the coefficients associated to most of the attributes apart 
from costs are slightly higher in magnitude for urban households than rural ones, which could be due to their level of 
awareness/understanding. The number of households that listen to a radio or read a newspaper captures this in the survey.10 
Table 5 below presents the econometric results by type of activity in the informal sector. From this Table, we observe that all 
attributes have significant coefficients across activities except for: petty trading (wherein public provider is not significant); 
and mining and quarrying (wherein waiting time and public provider are not significant). 
Table 5. Regression result for informal sector economic activities. 
Choice 
Petty 
Trading 
Subsistence 
Farming 
“Okada” 
Cattle 
Rearing 
Fishing Tailoring Mining Quarrying 
Coef (se) Coef (se) Coef (se) Coef (se) Coef (se) Coef (se) Coef (se) Coef (se) 
Coverage 
0.4911 0.5673 0.6471 0.6480 0.4102 0.5256 0.9838 0.2156 
(0.0313)*** (0.0359)*** (0.0355)** (0.0755)*** (0.0569)*** (0.0503)*** (0.0942)*** (0.0783)*** 
Waiting Time 
-0.010 -0.0057 -0.0110 -0.0103 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0041 0.0017 
(0.0014)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0033)*** (0.0025)** (0.0022)*** (0.0040) (0.0034) 
Public Provider 
-0.0469 0.0596 0.0737 0.1702 0.1571 0.1587 -0.0369 0.0574 
(0.0306) (0.0355)** (0.0343)** (0.0728)** (0.0562)*** (0.0492)*** (0.0885) (0.0779) 
Faith-Based 
Provider 
0.5508 0.3637 0.7604 0.7024 0.5689 0.6452 0.6480 0.2767 
(0.0316)*** (0.0359)*** (0.0364)*** (0.0771)*** (0.0577)*** (0.0510)*** (0.0930)*** (0.0782)*** 
Cost 
-0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00023 -0.0001 
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.00003)** (0.00003)** 
Constant 
0.8939 0.4330 1.0015 1.1940 0.5738 0.6898 1.0805 0.1107 
(0.1215)*** (0.1370)*** (0.1381)*** (0.2926)*** (0.2198)*** (0.1942)*** (0.3521)*** (0.3011) 
No of Obs 7074 5184 5886 1296 2052 2754 972 1026 
Wald chi2 (5) 703.8 381.17 797.78 159.47 151.98 269.82 178.39 24.20 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Log Likelihood -4496.42 -3383.0725 -3582.76 -800.3309 -1338.005 -1752.665 -549.75 -698.693 
***p<0.01; **p<0.005; *p<0.1 
                                                               
9 When we use any two kinds of coverage (simple and moderate; simple and comprehensive; and moderate and comprehensive) at any point in our regression, the results 
obtained move in the opposite direction of theory. For instance, we expect cost to be negative and coverage (of any kind) to be positive, but the result gives the opposite. 
Therefore, one type of coverage (moderate) was used right through and our results hinges on this.  
10 In the survey, we asked households whether they listen to the news or read newspapers. If the person answers yes, then it means they are often aware of currents issues 
and development in the country.  
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4.2. Willingness to Pay 
As described above, the DCE method allows one to 
estimate WTP when cost or price or out of pocket expenses is 
one of the attributes used in the experiment [5]. This involves 
calculating the MRS, which is the rate at which a household 
is willing to substitute (i.e., give up) one attribute in order to 
get one unit of the other attribute according to the estimated 
coefficients. It is the absolute value of the ratio of the 
coefficients associated to any two attributes used in the study 
(see equation 2). The direction and the interpretation depend 
on what the denominator is.  
We estimate WTP by replacing the denominator of the 
MRS with the cost coefficient. The WTP for health insurance 
is the amount of money a household is willing to forgo each 
month in order to attain an improvement in their health 
status. It is the monetary value households place on each 
health insurance attribute. Table 6 presents household WTP 
results for the main sample and type of location (see 
Appendix for individual WTP estimates). 
Table 6. Household WTP estimates11. 
Attributes 
Full Sample Rural Location Urban Location 
WTP (SLL) % of Income WTP (SLL) % of Income WTP (SLL) % of Income 
Total WTP1 44,428.5 13.3 37,250.5 8.5 54,348 16.4 
Coverage 31,965 9.6 28,500 8.6 36,568 10.8 
Public Provider 3,148 0.9 1,668 0.5 5,160 1.5 
Faith-Based Provider 33,080 9.9 24,063 7.3 45,067 13.3 
Waiting Time2 464 0.1 360 0.1 609 0.2 
Notes: WTP figures are expressed in Sierra Leone’s local currency – Leones.  
1. The total/overall WTP includes the amount the household is willing to pay for the health insurance scheme. 
2. Given the negative effect of waiting time, these estimates represent what individuals would need to be compensated for an increase in waiting time by one 
minute. 
Overall, households’ WTP is 44,428.5SLL/$6 per month (about 13.3% of their income) for health insurance which is in line 
with similar studies: first, Burkina Faso with an individual WTP of $3.17 and $4.25 using the take it or leave it (TIOLI) and 
bidding games respectively [9]; another work on WTP for health insurance was in Namibia wherein they found out that over 
50% of uninsured respondents are WTP $6.60 per month [2]; one other study in Rural Cameroon estimated that rural 
households are WTP $2.15 per person/month for health insurance [8]; (Note that all these studies used contingent valuation 
method in contrast to the DCE method used here). On average, households are WTP 31,965SLL/$4.32 (about 9.6% of average 
household income) for an improvement in coverage, 33,080SLL/$4.47 (about 9.9% of household income) for having a faith-
based health care provider, and 3,148SLL/$0.43 (about 1% of household income) to have a public health care provider and are 
WTP 464SLL/$0.06 (about 0.1% of their income) for a minute reduction in waiting time (equivalent to a WTP of 27,840SLL 
for a 60 minutes reduction in waiting time, or about 3.8% of household’s income).12 There are vast differences in households 
WTP across locations. Urban households are WTP about 28% more than rural households for an improvement in coverage; 
they are also WTP about 2 and 3 times more to have a faith-based or public provider respectively. Urban households are also 
WTP about 249 SLL/$0.03 more than their rural counterparts for a minute reduction in waiting time. However, comparing 
rural to urban households, overall, the latter is willing to pay 20,097.5SLL/$2.72 (about 5.9% of urban household income) 
more than what their rural counterparts are WTP. For a 60 minute reduction in waiting time, Urban households are WTP about 
14,940SLL (about 4.4% of household’s income) more than their rural counterparts. 
To also estimate the WTP for households based on income levels, four income levels were generated as shown below: 
Income Level One: 75,000SLL 218,750SLL 
Income Level Two: 218,751SLL 362,500SLL 
Income Level Three: 362,501SLL 506,250SLL 
Income Level Four: 506,251SLL 650,000SLL 
A random effect logit model is use to estimate the impact of each attribute on the choice of a health insurance scheme for 
households by level of income (See appendix for regression results). From these results, WTP for each attribute according to 
the income levels is estimated and the results shown in table 7 below. 
 
 
                                                               
11 We assume a household has 5 members, as it is the average household size in our survey. 
12 An exchange rate of 7400SLL to $1USD was used. 
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Table 7. WTP by income levels. 
Attributes 
Income Level 1 Income Level 2 Income Level 3 Income Level 4 
WTP 
(SLL) 
Percent of 
Income 
WTP 
(SLL) 
Percent of 
Income 
WTP 
(SLL) 
Percent of 
Income 
WTP 
(SLL) 
Percent of 
Income 
Coverage 5,777.3 3.4 6,790.7 2.3 6,603.8 1.6 7,124.6 1.3 
Waiting Time1 87.3 0.1 96.7 0.0 104.3 0.0 17.3 0.0 
Faith-Based Provider 10,426.4 6.1 15,808.8 5.3 12,956.1 3.1 12,713 2.3 
Public Provider 970.8 0.6 2,500.2 0.8 3,066.4 0.7 2,857.1 0.5 
Total WTP 15,320.12 8.9 25,196.3 8.4 22,731 5.50 24,712 4.44 
Average Income 171284.4 298500 415633 556185 
No of Observation 3924 11736 9054 2412 
Notes: SLL refers to Sierra Leonean Leones (local currency in Sierra Leone) 
1. Given the negative effect of waiting time, this estimate represents what individuals would need to be compensated for an increase in waiting time by one 
minute. 
2. Given the negative effect, this estimate represents what households of income Level 1 are WTP for not having (forgo) a public provider. 
Table 7 shows that households on the lowest income are 
WTP about 15,320.1SL (or about 9% of household income) 
for an improvement in coverage (from moderate to 
comprehensive), a reduction in waiting time by one minute, 
having a faith-based provider (rather than a private or public 
provider). This is substantially lower than for households 
with the highest income level who have a WTP of about 
24,712SLL. However, households on the lowest income 
level, WTP represent a higher proportion of their income 
(8.9%). However, as income increases, the WTP for health 
insurance represents a lower percent of household’s income 
(5.5% and 4.4% for income levels three and four 
respectively). 
4.3. Welfare Changes 
One of the primary reasons for using a DCE to elicit WTP 
for health insurance is to be able to estimate welfare changes 
associated to changes in health care policies. One can do so 
by using the concept of compensating variation (CV), in the 
case of switching health insurance schemes the CV is the 
monetary equivalent associated to the loss of utility due to 
the switch. 
As an illustration, consider two hypothetical health 
insurance scenarios (best and worst) and calculate the CV 
of switching from one to another. The first scheme (worst 
case) provides moderate coverage wherein households can 
go to a public provider, with a waiting time of 90 minutes 
and a cost of 10,000SLL per household member. The 
second scheme (best case) provides moderate coverage by 
a faith-based provider, a waiting time of 45 minutes, at a 
cost of 4,000SLL per household member. Following Small 
and Rosen (1981) in [34], the change in welfare associated 
to the switch from a public provider scheme to a faith-
based provider is the CV, i.e. CV = 
7
89:;<=
[?(@A#+,B%+CC 	D − ?(@A#E('+CC	D] , where ln 
(A#+,B%+CCD is the indirect utility associated to the faith-
based provider and ln( A#E('+CCD  is the indirect utility 
associated to having a public health care provider. Table 8 
below shows the CV for the full sample and for the 
different subsamples. 
Table 8. Probabilities and compensating variation (CV) for hypothetical 
case13. 
Sample 
Probabilities1 Compensating Variation 
Pubchh Contchh CV (SLL) CV (USD)2 
Full Sample 0.37490 0.62510 10,180.42 $1.38 
Rural 0.39799 0.60201 9,235.18 $1.25 
Urban 0.34884 0.65116 11,477.51 $1.55 
Petty Trading 0.35487 0.64513 11,496.51 $1.55 
Subsistence Farming 0.42457 0.57543 9,491.67 $1.28 
Okada 0.33477 0.66523 11,223.38 $1.52 
Cattle Rearing 0.37001 0.62999 9,557.42 $1.29 
Fishing 0.39849 0.60151 11,296.43 $1.53 
Tailoring 0.38072 0.61928 9,377.16 $1.27 
Mining 0.33517 0.66484 6,786.02 $0.92 
Quarrying 0.44538 0.55462 4,408.03 $0.60 
Notes:  
1. The probability of choosing a certain type of provider k is calculated as 
! =
)GH1
∑ )
GH.J
.KL
, where J=3 is the number of different types of providers 
available. 
2. Assuming exchange rate of 7400SLL to $1. 
Based on the estimated utilities, a household prefers the 
faith-based provider than the public one as, ceteris paribus; 
the probability of choosing the former is almost twice that of 
the latter. When comparing the various informal sectors, the 
argument is similar: The probability for faith-based provider 
is higher for “Okada” riders, petty trading and mining 
sectors. These are sectors predominantly urban, especially the 
first two. However, the probability of choosing the public 
provider is higher for households in informal sectors 
predominantly in rural settings or just outside urban areas, 
(quarrying, subsistence farming, tailoring and fishing).  
The CV does calculate the extent to which individuals are 
willing to trade money for the change in the type of provider. 
The CV associated to changing from the public provider 
health insurance scheme to the faith-based provider, which 
implies a decrease in the cost of health insurance of 30,000 
SLL (40,000SLL-10, 000SLL) and a reduction in the waiting 
time of 45 min (90min-45min) is 10,180.42SLL or $1.38. 
According to our calculation, households in urban locations 
have a higher CV, implying, they are willing to pay a higher 
                                                               
13 These estimates are for individual members. The average number of members 
in a household is five. 
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amount than their rural counterparts (about 25%) to switch to 
the faith-based provider, which supports earlier WTP results. 
A possible explanation is the higher level of awareness 
amongst these urban households. Among the informal 
sectors, households in petty trading, “okada” and fishing have 
higher CV’s because they live in urban areas or semi - urban 
dwellings. 
4.4. Tests of Validity of Responses 
The validity of responses basically ensures that the entire 
measurement process i.e. the collection of data and its 
analysis must not only be reliable but also free of systematic 
and uncontrolled bias that distort the estimated results. Two 
approaches are used in this study to test for internal validity.  
The first approach, consistency of preferences, is tested by 
including another pair of choice set in the DCE making the 
pair of choice sets to be 10. The 10th choice set include levels 
of attributes such that one alternative had better levels on all 
attributes. If households understand the DCE questions, we 
would expect them to choose the scheme with better levels of 
attributes. Only 66 households (4% of the sample) did not 
pass the test of consistency of preferences, in which case they 
were dropped from the sample. 
The second test is the theoretical validity wherein the sign 
and significance of parameter estimates are examined. To 
perform this test, interaction terms were created between the 
attribute cost and a characteristic of the household income. 
We do the same with the attribute waiting time. As per 
equation 2, we recalculated the WTP by inserting in the 
numerator the waiting time for a given level of income and in 
the denominator the coefficient of cost for that given level of 
income. We hypothesized that as income increases; 
households are WTP more for a reduction in waiting time 
[30]. 
Wald tests are used to test whether the newly constructed 
interaction variables are statistically different from each 
other. The z test is also used to test for significant differences 
in the resulting WTP values at different income level 
obtained by computing the ratio between the marginal effects 
of waiting time (numerator) and the marginal effects of costs 
at each level of income. A priori, it is expected that as income 
increases, households are WTP more for a reduction in 
waiting time. The results (available upon request) confirm 
that the interaction variables are statistically different from 
each other and that income levels are positively and 
significantly associated with the WTP values for a reduction 
in waiting time, which lends credence to our validity test. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper studies household’s WTP for health insurance 
among informal sector workers using the DCE. Eight 
informal sectors are chosen including petty trading, 
subsistence farming, commercial bike riding (Okada), cattle 
rearing, fishing, tailoring, quarrying, and mining. To the 
knowledge of the authors, this is the first study that estimates 
WTP for health insurance among informal sector workers in 
a Sub-Saharan African country context using the DCE 
methodology. It also looks at the issue of theoretical validity 
and shows that households living in urban areas have higher 
WTP than rural households. 
The benefits of using DCEs have been highlighted in the 
literature ranging from its capacity to estimate WTP, the 
preference for attributes in a given choice set and measuring 
welfare effects of a policy change [24, 33, 34]. Despite these 
advantages, the application of DCEs to estimate WTP 
especially in developing countries remains low. One possible 
suggestion is that developing countries are plagued with 
different cultural and language settings and high illiteracy 
rates, which renders the use of DCEs challenging [24]. 
The WTP estimated for Sierra Leone is in line with other 
studies within developing countries, that is, on average, an 
individual is willing to pay about $3 for health insurance.14In 
contrast to these, this study used the DCE method and 
disaggregated the results by location and across the eight 
main informal sector activities in Sierra Leone. The results 
show that the faith - based provider and coverage are the 
most important attributes in determining a households’ choice 
of health insurance scheme. Waiting time to see a medical 
staff and accessing a public provider are considered the least 
important attributes in determining a households’ choice of 
health insurance scheme. 
Moreover, this study shows a pattern: coverage is the most 
important attribute for households in activities predominant 
in rural settings whereas faith-based provider is 
predominantly significant for urban or near urban settings. 
The result also shows that the probability of a household 
choosing a faith - based provider is almost twice the 
probability of choosing a public provider. This suggests that 
the public health care system in this setting, like perhaps in 
other African countries, is in an appalling situation (possibly 
highly corrupt). Hence households prefer the faith-based 
system. To increase people’s well-being policy makers may 
want to invest more into faith - based providers, as about 
60% of households prefer such schemes. 
The results also show that it does make a difference 
whether you are located in the rural area or urban area [in 
line with 39]. Urban households are WTP about 
54348SLL/$7.34 (about 16.4% of urban household’s income) 
more than rural households for health insurance. Possible 
explanation for this higher WTP for health insurance by 
urban households is that they have a better income, better 
level of education and higher level of awareness, which in 
line with the literature; higher income, education and 
awareness increase ones WTP. 
In terms of WTP for improvements in any of the attributes, 
urban households are WTP about 50% more than their rural 
counterparts for an improvement in coverage. This difference 
is due to the level of awareness and understanding with 
regard to health issues, which are higher among urban 
households than their rural counterparts, hence they are able 
                                                               
14These studies used the contingent valuation method as opposed to the DCE 
method this paper uses. 
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to know which coverage will make them better off. 
Moreover, urban households compared to rural households 
are WTP about 2 times more for having a faith - based 
provider and about 28 percent more for having an 
improvement in coverage. In terms of waiting time, 
households in rural and urban areas are quite similar. 
In line with theory, it was also found out that household’s 
income matters; households on higher income are willing to 
pay more but cover a proportionately smaller fraction of their 
income, whereas, those on lower income are willing to pay 
less and covers a proportionately higher percentage of their 
income. 
The study also shows that the probability of a household 
choosing a faith-based type of provider is about twice that of 
choosing a public type of provider. Households are willing to 
pay about 10,180SLL/$1.38 for switching to a faith-based 
provider, a decrease in cost from 10,000SLL to 4,000SLL and 
a reduction in waiting time from 90minutes to 45minutes. 
The paper also tested for the validity of responses and the 
result lends credence to the study. External validity could not 
be tested on the grounds that it is still difficult to estimate. 
However, some studies do assume sufficient external validity 
for their study [38]. 
This study has some methodological limitations. The first, 
which is a weakness of the DCE method, is that respondents 
sometimes experience difficulties when answering the 
questions. In particular, interviewers find it difficult to recall 
issues regarding health care expenditure mentioned by 
respondents or difficulties in understanding the DCE process, 
hence spending longer than normal times. In addition, 
disadvantages of face-to-face interviews are that it takes 
respondent’s time to complete, which is costly, and 
interviewer bias may have arisen due to this fact. Secondly, 
the experimental design limits the number of levels for each 
attribute. The equal levels of attributes in the DCE design 
used in this study (i.e. three levels for each attribute), may 
impose a cost on the experiment because some attributes may 
naturally require more than three levels [17 pp. 108]. More 
levels of attributes would have involved higher expenses and 
more difficulties for respondents to understand the 
experiment. A third limitation is related to sampling and non-
sampling errors. However, increasing the sample size and the 
method used to select the sample mitigated the issue of 
sampling error. The sample used was estimated ensuring that 
it meets the minimum sample size requirement for a DCE 
(see [7] for a detailed analysis of estimating sample size). 
However, non-sampling error remains the most important 
source of error in the estimates and may arise from many 
different sources. Interviewers may make mistakes in the 
collection of data or respondents may also forget activities 
such as hospital visits or the associated costs and may 
respond irrationally (although we provided some robustness 
checks). Fourth, this study only looked at informal sector 
workers in two (northern and western) out of four regions. 
Including the other regions would have given a more 
representative picture of the country. 
Despite these limitations, the study constitutes a valuable 
contribution to the existing literature. It reveals that informal 
sector households are WTP more for a faith-based provider 
than a public provider and for an improvement in coverage. 
This sends out a clear message to policy makers that in 
establishing a health insurance scheme, the focus should be 
shifted to faith-based providers and the type of coverage. It 
also shows that households in urban areas and richer 
households are in general WTP more than their rural and 
poorer counterparts, which may call for targeted interventions. 
Appendix 
Table 9. Willingness to pay estimates per individual. 
Attributes Main Sample 
Rural 
Location 
Urban 
Location 
Total WTP 8885.7 7450.1 10869.6 
Coverage 6392.92 5700.01 7313.51 
Public Provider 629.55 333.66 1032.06 
Faith-Based Provider 6616.0 4812.54 9013.37 
Waiting Time15  92.90 71.89 121.72 
Table 10. Regression results by income groups. 
Attributes 
Income One Income Two 
Income 
Three 
Income 
Four 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coverage 
0.46218 0.61116 0.59434 0.49872 
(0.02591)*** (0.02482)*** (0.04223)*** (0.06602)*** 
Waiting 
Time 
-0.00698 -0.0087 -0.00939 -0.00121 
(0.00113)*** (0.00108)*** (0.00184)*** (0.00285) 
Faith-Based 
Provider 
0.83411 1.42279 1.16605 0.95991 
(0.05195)*** (0.05064)*** (0.08561)*** (0.06438)*** 
Public 
Provider 
-0.07766 0.22502 0.27598 0.27001 
(0.0511) (0.04815)*** (0.08268)*** (0.06494)*** 
Cost 
-0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00009 -0.00007 
(8.53e-
06)*** 
(8.10e-
06)*** 
(0.00001)*** (0.00002)*** 
Constant 
0.30080 0.21344 0.2046 0.35392 
(0.09937)*** (0.12255)* (0.06385)*** (0.10387)*** 
Mean 
Income 
(SLL) 
171284.40 298500 415633 556185 
No of 
Observations 
3924 11736 9054 2412 
Wald chi2 399.89 1411.34 693.81 158.02 
Prob.>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log 
Likelihood 
-2485.34 -7283.33 -5888.78 -1584.32 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1  
1Moderate coverage is used to define coverage. 
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